![]() |
|||||||
|
|||||||
Palestinian Civil War
by John M. Curtis Copyright November 15, 2007
Whether accepted or not, a sizable majority voted Hamas into power precisely because the Palestine Liberation Organization and it late founder Yasser Arafat never delivered a Mideast peace. Years of corruption and broken promises drove rank-and-file Palestinians toward the more radical Hamas. Arafat died Nov. 11, 2004 of suspicious causes, possibly poisoning, handing power to Abbas. Palestinians settled the score and voted Hamas a decisive majority in parliament, leaving Abbas isolated without any real authority. When the White House began the latest attempt at peacemaking, they approached the moderate Abbas, totally bypassing the more militant Hamas. Abbas, who established a separate government in the West Bank town of Ramallah, lashed out, fingering “the outlawed gangs affiliated with Hamas in Gaza City,” asking all Palestinians to revolt. Pro-Abbas demonstrators encountered live Hamas ammo, killing eight civilians and wounding scores more. Without real armed resistance, Abbas won't convince Gaza residents to rise up against Hamas. If anything, Hamas derives its support from Palestinians who don't trust Abbas or the primary sponsor of the next round of Mideast peacemaking—the U.S. Israel has turned up the screws in Gaza, sealing its borders, closing down factories and squeezing an already broken economy. While Gaza residents suffer, they're not likely to trust Abbas or the U.S. Abbas wants to negotiate directly with Israel but lacks the popular mandate to ignore Palestinians' legally elected government. Calling for a new Intifada [uprising] against Hamas doesn't resonate with a majority of Palestinians that see Abbas, Israel and the U.S. as responsible for Gaza's collective misery. Abbas must convince the same majority that voted Hamas into office that they should follow his Palestinian Authority and evict the elected government. Unlike Arafat that had a close relationship with Hamas and other splinter groups, Abbas lacks an effective security force, allowing Gaza to fall. Arafat used Hamas, like he used Fatah and Al Aqsa Martyr's Brigade, as a de facto military with the implacable goal of defeating Israel. Sept. 11 brought a new U.S. policy and doctrine for dealing with terrorists, preventing, as past U.S. presidents, the government from dealing with terrorists, no matter what the cause. Bush broke with 50 years of official neutrality in U.S. Mideast policy, branding the PLO and Arafat terrorists, breaking off diplomatic relations and officially seeking new Palestinian leadership. U.S. policy would no longer permit dealing with terrorists. Dealing with Abbas presents a real dilemma for U.S. Mideast policy. Palestinians spoke loudly when they voted Hamas into office in free and fair elections. While the U.S. may not like the outcome, brokering a Mideast peace with Abbas can only invite bloody civil war. Before U.S. officals push for a “democracy agenda” in the Middle East or elsewhere, they'd better brace themselves for the type of governments voted into office. Abbas lacks not only the security forces but the popular mandate to negotiate on behalf the Palestinians. He walks a dangerous tightrope calling on Palestinian's to rise up against what he refers to as outlaws and criminals. Before Abbas joins Israel in a new U.S.-brokered peace summit, he should resolve current divisions pushing Palestinians toward civil war. No deal that excludes the elected government will be considered legitimate. Before Abbas invites Palestinians into civil war, he should negotiate with Hamas to cede power to a unified Palestinian authority. Speaking on the 19th anniversary of Palestinians' declaration of independence in Algeria, Abbas tried to rally Gaza residents to his cause. Ignoring Hamas doesn't solve Abbas' dilemma working tirelessly toward establishing an independent Palestinian state. Just as Arafat did in 1988 when he declared independence, Hamas must also recognize Israel's right to exist and agree to live in peace. Haniyeh and Syrian-based exiled Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal must resolve existential questions about Israel before Abbas can legitimately broker a Mideast peace and negotiate an independent Palestinians state. Unless Hamas gives up its war with Israel, Abbas won't get his Palestinian state: Negotiating for half a Palestinian state won't work. About the Author John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma. |
|||||||
![]() |
|||||||
Home || Articles || Books || The Teflon Report || Reactions || About Discobolos ©1999-2005 Discobolos Consulting Services, Inc. |