U.S. Combat Operations End in Iraq

by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright August 22, 2010
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             When former President George W. Bush decided to topple Saddam Hussein March 20, 2003, his administration, led by former Vice President Dick Cheney, made a compelling national security argument:  In the wake of Sept. 11, the U.S. could no longer tolerate threats by the Iraqi dictator.  U.N. Chief Weapons’ inspector Dr. Hans Blix begged the U.S. to hold off, telling the White House Saddam possessed no weapons of mass destruction.  Secretary of State Colin L. Powell made a convincing case to the U.N. Feb. 2, 2003 about Iraq’s biological and nuclear weapons capability.  His “compelling” intel was based on cherry-picked data from the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans, run by fellow neocon Douglas Feith Jr., now a Georgetown professor in international relations.  One trillion dollars later and 4,417 dead Americans, President Barack Obama finally ended combat operations.

            U.S. military strength peaked during Bush’s “troop surge” at 170,000 and will draw down through 2011 to 50,000.  Bush and Cheney warned repeatedly of an al-Qaeda takeover in Iraq, if the U.S. scaled back military operations.  Since Barack took office Jan. 20, 2009, Iraq combat operations has ratcheted down.  While Barack made good on a campaign promise to end combat operations, he escalated the Afghan war by over 50,000 troops.  U.S. Iraq casualty rates have steadily declined from a 2007 peak of 961 to 150 in 2010.  Not surprisingly, death rates have escalated five fold in Afghanistan to 451 in 2010, the highest levels of the nearly nine-year old conflict.  “We don’t see that happening,” said Iraq commander Gen Ray Odierno, asked whether U.S. combat operations could resume in Iraq.  Bush and Cheney’s predictions of an al-Qaeda takeover never took place.

            Suicide bombings by rival Sunni and Shiite groups in Iraq continue, regardless of the end to U.S. combat operations.  Iraq’s U.S.-backed government of Nouri al-Maliki no longer has a popular mandate after losing elections Aug. 4, 2010 to rival Dr. Ayad Allawi, a moderate Shiite politician.  Al-Maliki has refused to give up power, whose powerful alliance with exiled Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and his 10,000-plus al-Mahdi militia cements his grip on power.  Installing Allawi’s parliament would potentially cause Shiite civil war, with al-Maliki refusing to surrender power.  It’s most ironic that al-Maliki’s government has close ties to Iran’s Shiites loyal to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahamadinejad.  Gen. Odierno credits Iraq’s improved security to Iraq’s new security forces when, in fact, it’s due to al-Maliki’s reliance on al-Sadr’s al-Mahdi army.

            Obama administration officials worry privately about al-Maliki’s refusal to surrender power to Allawi and form a new parliament.  “We will have an enduring relationship of having some military presence in Iraq.  I think that would be smart not to let thing unwind over the next three to five years,” said Sen. Lindsay O. Graham (R-S.C.) ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.  Odierno views democracy as the ultimate standard of Iraq’s success.  “A strong democratic Iraq will bring stability to the Middle East, and if we see Iraq that’s moving toward that, two, three, five years form now, I think we can call our operations a success,” said Odierno.  What Odierno doesn’t get is that the same “democratic” Iraq could vote in Islamic militants, much the same way Palestinians voted in Hamas Jan. 27, 2006.  Democracy has a double-edged sword in Iraq or elsewhere in the Middle East.

             Bush promised he would not use the U.S. military for nation-building, or determining a U.S.-friendly government.  His decision to invade Iraq at great expense to U.S. blood and treasure complicates the ultimate outcome.  Spreading the military too thin or breaking the U.S. treasury can hardly be regarded as a successful operation.  Odierno insists that Iran continues to meddle in Iraq’s internal affairs, funding and supplying weapons to insurgents fighting U.S. occupation.  Odierno won’t come clean that the Iraqi government of al-Maliki has loyalty and ties to Iran.  Odierno sees Iran as meddling when, indeed, al-Maliki has cut deals with Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khamenei.  “They don’t want to see Iraq turn into a strong democratic country.  They’d rather see it become a weak governmental institution,” said Odierno, ignoring al-Maliki’s close relationship with Tehran.

            Ending combat operations in Iraq is long overdue when you consider the costly toll on U.S. troops and tax dollars.  Bush’s original premise for going to war was built on cherry-picked intel about Saddam’s alleged arsenal of WMD.  Once it was determined that wasn’t a threat to U.S. national security, Bush should have pivoted out of Iraq at the earliest possible time.  Instead he ignored Afghanistan and wasted untold U.S. resources chasing an imaginary enemy responsible for Sept. 11.  Democratizing Iraq would surely result, like in Gaza, with a more radical Islamic regime.  Continuing to support al-Maliki only makes Iraq’s post-Saddam transition more complicated.  Most Iraqis picked Allawi over al-Maliki precisely because of his independence from Iran.  Supporting al-Maliki now proves the U.S. doesn’t really support democracy only the government most easily controlled by the U.S.

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

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